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2411 Sutters Mill Ln. 
Knoxville, Tn 37909 
May 11, 1994 
Dr. Bruce Wheeler 
University Honors Department 
The University of Tennessee 
Knoxville, TN 37916 
Dear Dr. Wheeler: 
As you requested, here is the report on prosecutorial vindictiveness. 
This report provides important information about the role of 
prosecutors in our criminal justice system and amount of discretion 
which they are afforded. However, its primary focus is on the 
interesting, and somewhat confusing problem of prosecutorial 
vindictiveness. The legal world is still searching for a definitive 
answer on just what exactly constitutes vindictive behavior. I feel 
like this should be a help in clearing up that issue. 
This report contains an opening section defining and describing 
a prosecutor and his role. It pays special attention to pressures that 
are unique to a prosecutor's job, and exhibits the need for the speedy 
and inexpensive disposition of a large number of cases. It then 
explains the basic premise of prosecutorial vindictiveness, an abuse 
of the prosecutor's discretionary power. What follows is a case 
history of the development of the prosecutorial vindictiveness 
doctrine, and finally an analysis of what comprises vindictive 
behavior by a prosecutor today. The references are done according 
to the Uniform System of Citation, volume 15. At the end I added an 
extra references consulted page, even though my reference system 
doesn't require this, because I also gained understanding of my topic 
through sources I did not cite. 
The information found in this report should be useful to 
anyone who wants to be well informed about the role of a prosecutor 
and the limits of his power. Thank you for your help in planning this 
project. If you have any question regarding this report, please call 
me at 584-3217. 
I;Z/~ 

John P. Krimmel 
INFORMATIVE ABSTRACT 
Prosecutors are granted a large amount of discretionary power in the 
performance of their duties. Because of this large amount of 
discretion, and because of the many pressures inherent in the job 
of a prosecutor, this discretionary power is sometimes abused. One 
such abuse is prosecutorial vindictiveness, "the forbidden practice of 
penalizing a defendant's exercise of a right." The Supreme Court uses 
two standards in adjudicating claims of vindictiveness: the in-fact 
standard and the appearance . standard. The Court determines which 
standard to apply in each case depending upon whether or not the 
prosecution has a motive to be vindictive. In addition, the Court has 
ruled that there is no such thing as vindictive behavior during plea 
bargaining. 
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Introduction 

Lately there has been disagreement among federal circuit 
courts about what kind of behavior comprises prosecutorial 
vindictiveness. This confusion has led to lengthy debate about how 
these claims should be adjudicated, but little has been accomplished 
to clarify the issue. It seems as if many prosecutors and even some 
judges lack an understanding of what comprises legitimate and 
effective use of a prosecutor's power and what comprises vindictive 
behavior, which is banned by our system of law. There have been 
several landmark decisions in this area, and their confusing and 
seemingly contradictory nature has only added to the confusion 
about the issue. However, a close look at the case law of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness will reveal that this problem can be 
understood and therefore avoided. 
This report will provide all of the information you will need to 
know in order to become informed about the problem of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness. After defining the role a prosecutor 
plays in our criminal justice system, with special reference to the 
many pressures that might lead a prosecutor to abuse his 
discretionary power, the report will focus on prosecutorial 
vindictiveness itself. This focus will be accomplished by explaining 
the evolution of the prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine through an 
extensive case study, which will be followed by an analysis of the 
doctrine as it stands today. Finally, I will propose an interpretation 
that should help clarify how to adjudicate new claims of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness as they surface. By the time this report 
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is finished, you will have a better understanding of our criminal 
justice system in general, and a crystal-clear view of the limits of a 
prosecutor's discretionary power. 
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Definition of a Prosecutor 
The prosecuting attorney is one of the most valuable and 
powerful public officials in today's society. He is the person who is 
responsible for making sure that justice is achieved swiftly and 
accurately, and is granted a large amount of discretion in order to 
balance the many demands of his job. But since a prosecutor is 
granted so much discretion over the discharge of his power, it is 
important to take a look at just what a prosecutor is and what he 
does. A prosecutor, as defined in The New World Dictionary of the 
American Language, is a public official who is an attorney and who 
conducts criminal prosecutions on behalf of the State or the people. 
However, this definition, while it is accurate, does not give us a real 
sense of who an attorney is or what he does. It gives us no sense of 
the extensive education it takes to become an attorney, the duties of 
a prosecutor, the conditions a prosecutor works under, or the 
pressures that come with being a prosecutor. Because it is important 
that we understand all of these things before we can grasp special 
problems that plague the legal system, such as prosecutorial 
vindictiveness (which will be studied in depth later in this report), 
this definition is not adequate. However, it does provide a good base 
to build on in order to come up with a definition that is adequate. 
The first term that we must explore in the New World 
definition is the phrase, "who is an attorney." An obvious question 
that comes to mind is, "How does one become an attorney?" To 
become an attorney today, a person must be both trained in legal 
matters and licensed by the State. 
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The first step towards practicing law in most states is receiving 
a law degree from a law school. In order to be accepted into law 
school, an applicant must go through a lengthy and highly 
competitive process. He must obtain a four year undergraduate 
degree from a college or university, and score well on a standardized 
test called the Law School Admissions Test. Upon fulfilling these 
requirements, and submitting various other things such as 
recommendations of his academic ability and character to the school 
of his choice, he may be considered for enrollment into an A.B.A. 
(American Bar Association) accredited law school. Upon acceptance 
into such a school, a student will begin extensive study of the law. 
Most law school programs take three years of study to complete. 
Courses are taken in all major branches of both public and private 
law. Special emphasis is given to such subjects as torts, contracts, 
taxes, and the constitution. These and other subjects are taught 
according to the case method, which was developed at Harvard Law 
School. This method trains students in legal methods through the 
reading, analysis, and discussion of actual court cases. In addition to 
regular coursework, a law student participates in several other 
activities. These activities may include clerkships, writing for a 
student publication called a Law Review, or conducting mock trials 
in a competition called a moot court (see figure 1). Upon completion 
of three years of law school, a student receives a J.D. (Doctor of 
Jurisprudence) degree. 
Upon receiving a J.D. degree, a lawyer seeks to earn his license 
to practice law. This license is granted by the bar, the body of 
lawyers who already have a license to practice in the state. 
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Figure 1 Students at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago 
participate in a moot court competition. 
SOURCE: World Book Encyclopedia, Vol L, p. 138, 1993. 
Normally, this license is received after successful completion of the 
state bar examination. However, a few states automatically license 
graduates of approved law schools in the state without an 
examination. 
Upon receiving a law degree and a license to practice, a 
prosecutor will take a position as a public prosecutor, usually in a 
district attorney's office. His job will then be to act on behalf of the 
government to prosecute a party (usually an individual) for the 
alleged commission of a crime. At this point his duties will include 
any or all of the following: gathering evidence, filing petitions, 
advising others in legal matters, negotiating with the other attorney, 
selecting juries, applying law to specific cases, and filing briefs. Once 
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a case goes to trial, he prepares opening and closing arguments, 
introduces evidences, interrogates witnesses, and argues questions of 
law and fact. 
However, most cases never go to trial. This is because there is 
a large backlog of cases in criminal courts at all times, and the courts 
simply do not have the resources to fully prosecute alleged criminals 
in every case. Therefore, there is tremendous pressure on 
prosecutors to negotiate with the criminals. In this negotiation, 
called plea bargaining, the prosecutor offers a defendant a lesser 
sentence in return for a guilty plea. In this way, the prosecutor can 
dismiss a large number of cases relatively quickly without having to 
go to all of the trouble of taking a case to court. A prosecutor may be 
tempted to enter into plea bargaining if the evidence against the 
defendant is not overly compelling, if the defendant has retained a 
highly skilled and successful defense attorney, if the prosecutor does 
not have the resources (money, witnesses) to prosecute successfully, 
or simply if there is a large backlog of cases that must be disposed of. 
It is estimated that between 80 and 95 percent of all cases are plea 
bargained.! 
For prosecutors, another advantage to plea bargaining is that it 
often leads to an impressive conviction rate for the prosecutor. This 
is important, because a high conviction rate is essential if the 
prosecutor would like to be promoted or take a job in the more 
lucrative private sector. Unfortunately, this incentive to win 
provides a strong temptation for prosecutors to forego justice and 
convict even innocent defendants. This does not happen often, but 
1See J. Scheh & O. Stephens, American Constitutional Law at 836 (1993). 
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abuses of the system do exist. In the famous case Adams vs. Texas, 
defendant Randall Adams was convicted of a murder and sentenced 
to death for a crime he did not commit (See figure 2). Afterward, 
Dallas County District Attorney Henry Wade allegedly bragged, "Any 
prosecutor can convict a guilty man. But it takes someone really 
good to convict an innocent one. "2 Fortunately, Adams' conviction 
was overturned after the actual murderer admitted that he had 
committed the crime. Even though such practices are extremely rare, 
it is scary to think that the competitiveness of a court room is 
sufficient enough to drive some prosecutors to sentence an innocent 
man to death. 
A prosecutor is a special kind of person. He must be smart 
enough and motivated enough to make it through law school and 
become licensed to practice law. He must be able to perform duties 
in almost every aspect of the law, and dispose of a monumental 
number of cases. He must also be able to resist the temptations of 
the spoils that accompany high conviction rates, and remember that 
justice is utmost in all circumstances. Perhaps most incredibly, he 
must be willing to do all of this for the pay of a public official. 
2See R. Adams, Adams v. Texas at 301. 
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Figure 2 	 Because Dallas County, Texas, District Attorney Henry Wade 
became overly concerned with his 100% conviction 
rate, innocent Randall Adams faced the electric chair. 
SOURCE: American Constitutional Law. Stephens and Scheb, 
p.843. 
8 
Abuse of Prosecutorial Discretion 
As we have already found, a prosecutor in the United States 
enjoys a degree of discretion that is unparalleled in the legal systems 
of the Western World.3 And, as James Madison told us, "a 
governmental body wielding unbridled discretionary power is 
certain to abuse that power. "4 Just as a governmental body can take 
advantage of its discretionary power, so may a prosecutor. We like 
to think that abuses of this power are rare; still we know that they 
do occur at least occasionally. As we have seen, there are many 
reasons why a prosecutor would like to enter into plea negotiations 
and avoid a full-blown trial: if the evidence obtained against the 
defendant of is not overly compelling, if the defendant has retained a 
highly skilled and successful defense attorney, if the prosecutor does 
not have the resources (money, witness) to prosecute successfully, or 
simply if there is a large backlog of cases that must be disposed of. 
If a defendant refuses to submit a plea of gUilty (or if he does any 
other thing which might complicate a case for a prosecutor) under 
these circumstances, the prosecutor has a legitimate interest in 
denying a defendant the exercise of his constitutional or statutory 
rights to a trial, which may delay the outcome of the case and 
require the prosecutor to use valuable time and money. Therefore, it 
is not beyond the realm of possibility that a prosecutor, facing these 
dilemmas, might threaten and punish a defendant choosing to 
3 See M. Garnick, Two Models of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, in The Georgia 

Law Review at 467 (Winter '83). 

4Id. at 474. 
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exercise his rights by forcing him to risk suffering a greater penalty. 
"This type of retaliation clearly constitutes a more serious abuse of 
discretionary authority, for it punishes a person under color of law 
for doing what the law plainly allows. "5 The Supreme Court has 
ruled that vindictiveness of this sort is "a due process violation of the 
most basic sort" and a "flagrant violation of the fourteenth 
amendment" due process clause.6 Even though the Supreme Court 
has clearly ruled that prosecutorial vindictiveness is an abuse of the 
prosecutor's power, there has been much debate about what kind of 
behavior actually is considered vindictive by a prosecutor. In order 
to understand the present law regarding prosecutorial 
vindictiveness, we must have an understanding of how the present 
doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness came about. What follows 
then, is a case study of the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness. 
5 [d. at 475. 

6 See R. Castro, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in the Fifth Circuit, in The 

Thurgood Marshall Law Review at 179 (Fall '85). 
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The Doctrine of Prosecutorial 

Vindictiveness 

A. Judicial Vindictiveness is Defined and Outlawed 
1. North Carolina v. Pearce 
The first decision in the area of vindictiveness addressed the 
issue of judicial vindictiveness. This question came to the courts In 
the form of North Carolina v. Pearce. In this case, the defendant had 
originally been convicted of assault with intent to commit rape and 
had been given a sentence of 12-15 years. Some years later the 
conviction was set aside due to a successful appeal that the 
defendant's confession had been obtained unconstitutionally. At this 
time, Pearce was retried, reconvicted, and resentenced before the 
same judge that had done so in his initial trial. This time, however, 
the judge gave him a sentence that was three years longer than his 
first sentence. Because of the increased sentence, Pearce once again 
appealed, claiming that he had been a victim of double jeopardy and 
had been denied his rights to equal protection and due process. 
The Supreme Court first dispelled the notion that Pearce had 
been the victim of double jeopardy or had been denied his rights to 
equal protection. The Court went on to say that if the longer 
sentence was handed down "for the explicit purpose of punishing the 
defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original conviction 
set aside [it would constitute] a flagrant violation of the Fourteenth 
1 1 

Amendment. "7 In an important addition to this ruling, the Court 
declared that "since the fear of such vindictiveness may 
unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal 
his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be 
freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motive on the part of the 
sentencing judge. tt8 Also, the Court required that in cases in which a 
judge hands down a stricter sentence upon retrial the reasons for 
doing so must ttaffirmatively appear," and those reasons must be 
made a part of the record. As a result of this decision, judicial 
vindictiveness was effectively outlawed. "In essence, the Pearce 
decision established that judicial vindictiveness must play no role In 
resentencing a defendant upon retrial after successful appeal of his 
original conviction. tt9 This decision declared that vindictiveness was 
outlawed not only in fact, but also in appearance, since the 
appearance of vindictiveness might cause enough apprehension in 
defendants to suppress them from exercising their constitutional 
rights to due process through appeals of convictions, and to provide 
extra assurance to defendants that a heavier sentence upon 
reconviction was not an inherent risk of appeals. The reasoning of 
this decision set up two distinguishing models of thought about 
vindictiveness. One such model of thought, often called the in-fact 
model, states that the primary purpose of the rule against 
prosecutorial vindictiveness is to prevent prosecutors from acting 
vindictively. The second model, often called the apprehension or 
appearance model, states that the primary purpose of the rule is to 
7395 U.s. 723. 
8Id. 

9 See supra note 6. 
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protect defendants from being deterred from exercising their 
constitutional rights. 
2. Colten v. Kentucky 
There was little controversy surrounding the first part of the 
Court's decision in Pearce. However, many were surprised that the 
Court outlawed tougher sentences in those cases almost completely, 
including cases were there was no evidence of actual vindictive 
behavior, since it allowed for the appearance of vindictiveness. In 
Colten v. Kentucky the defendant had been convicted of a 
misdemeanor in a lower court and had exercised his right to a trial 
de novo in a higher court. He was then tried under the same facts 
for a felony, and was convicted and sentenced more harshly. Upon 
appeal the Court made an exception to the appearance part of the 
Pearce decision, and instead applied only the in-fact standard of 
vindictiveness for this case (and subsequently others) because the 
defendant was retried and resentenced before a different judge. In 
stating that when a defendant exercised a right to a trial de novo he 
was risking an increased punishment if convicted, the Court asserted 
that the trial was a "fresh determination of guilt or innocence. "1 0 
This reasoning was supported in that the first record was not a part 
of the second trial and that the judge was probably unaware of the 
original sentence and therefore could not deliberately increase the 
severity of the sentence. 
3. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe 
In this case, the Court extended the reasoning that excluded the 
apprehension model from cases in which a different judge presided 
1 0407 U.S. 117 (1972). 
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to cases in which a different jury presided. The Court found that 
there was no danger of vindictiveness upon resentencing by a new 
jury for two reasons. First, the new jury would obviously be made 
up of different members. Second, the new jury should be unaware 
not only of the result but also the existence of the first trial. 
Therefore, it was unreasonable to apply the appearance standard of 
vindictiveness in this situation, and the defendant would have to 
prove not only that there was an opportunity for vindictiveness to 
occur, but that vindictiveness actually did occur. 
In both Colten and Chaffin the Supreme Court focused more on 
whether or not actual vindictiveness was a possibility (the in-fact 
standard) and less on whether these decisions would cause 
apprehension among defendants and deter them from exercising 
their rights. The Court found that in Colten and Chaffin there was no 
real possibility of vindictiveness and applied the in-fact standard to 
deciding claims of vindictiveness. These cases differed from Pearce 
(which applied the appearance standard) because "vindictiveness is 
only a predictable threat in situations where the second sentencing 
party has a stake in the prior conviction and, thus, has a motive to be 
vindictive. "1 1 
B. The Idea of Vindictiveness is Extended to Prosecutors 
1. Blackledge Y. Perry 
In 1974 the Supreme Court extended the standard of 
vindictiveness for judges to prosecutors in Blackledge v. Perry. In 
1 1412 U.S. 18. (1972). 
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Blackledge the defendant, who was already serving a prison term, 
exercised his right to a trial de novo. Before the trial convened, the 
prosecutor returned to the grand jury and obtained an indictment 
which increased the charge against Perry from a misdemeanor to a 
felony. Upon pleading guilty, Perry was sentenced to a term that 
was seventeen months longer than his initial sentence for the same 
offense. Perry then petitioned the Supreme Court on the grounds 
that he had been a victim of double jeopardy and had been denied 
his rights to due process. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court declared 
that the prosecutor's power to seek a greater sentence was 
comparable to a judge's power to give a greater sentence.1 2 They 
further noted that, like a judge, a prosecutor has comparable or even 
greater reasons to be vindictive: "appeal of the case increases the 
demand on scarce prosecutorial resources, a successful appeal 
increases the chances that a previously convicted defendant will be 
set free, and a high conviction rate has potential political 
importance. "13 Thus, the Court emphasized in Blackledge that the 
opportunity for vindictiveness was present, even though there was 
no evidence that the prosecutor had indeed acted vindictively. Since 
the prosecutor had a stake in the prior conviction, or at least a stake 
in preventing the use of resources in order to reconvict, this case was 
able to be determined according to the appearance standard. The 
Court found that the opportunity for vindictiveness was present, 
even though there was no actual evidence, and declared the stricter 
12See N. Whitehead, Evaluating Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Claims in Non­
plea-bargained Cases, in The Southern California Law Review at 1138-39 (May 
'82). 
13417 U.S. 27. 
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sentence unconstitutional. In so doing the Court relied on the 
purpose of preventing the defendant's apprehension that he will be 
subject to an increased sentence as punishment for pursuing his 
rights. 
2. Bordenkircher v. Hayes 
Shortly after the Court reached its decision in Blackledge 
another question of prosecutorial vindictiveness arose in the form of 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes. In this case Hayes, the defendant, had been 
arrested and charged with the felony of forging a check in the 
amount of $88.30. This was punishable by a term of two to ten 
years. Although Hayes technically qualified as a habitual offender 
under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act, the prosecutor charged 
him based solely on his third arrest. During plea bargaining, the 
prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence of five years for Hayes 
in return for a guilty plea. At this time, Hayes was also informed 
that if he did not accept this agreement and plead guilty, the 
prosecutor would return to the grand jury and seek an indictment as 
an habitual offender. Hayes was informed that if he was convicted 
under the Habitual Criminal Act he would be subject to a mandatory 
life sentence because of his two prior felony convictions. In the 
subsequent trial proceedings the prosecutor described his plea offer 
in the following way: "Isn't it a fact that I told you at that time if 
you did not intend to plead guilty to five years for this charge and . . 
. save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial and taking 
up this time that I intended to return to the grand jury and ask them 
to indict you based upon these prior felony convictions?"14 However, 
1 4434 u.s. 357. 
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even after receiving this threat, Hayes chose not to plead guilty and 
insisted upon receiving his right to a trial. A jury then found Hayes 
guilty of the charge and of being convicted twice before of felonies, 
and subsequently handed down the mandatory life sentence. Hayes 
then filed an appeal based on the questionable constitutionality of 
the enhanced sentence. 
The Supreme Court upheld Hayes' conviction with the increased 
sentence as constitutional. As Supreme Court Justice Stewart noticed 
in his majority opinion, nIt is not disputed that the recidivist charge 
was fully justified by the evidence, that the prosecutor was in 
possession of this evidence at the time of the original indictment, and 
that Hayes' refusal to plead guilty to the original charge was what led 
to his indictment under the habitual criminal statute. "1 5 However, 
the opinion went on to note that all of this was immaterial "since the 
prosecutor's conduct did no more than openly present the defendant 
with the alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges on which he 
was plainly subject to prosecution. "1 6 Since the Court had decided 
that the "value of open plea bargaining outweighs the need to protect 
defendants from the possibility of prosecutorial vindictiveness, "1 7 
the effect of the decision in Bordenkircher was that it exempted 
prosecutorial behavior from the limitations imposed on it by 
prosecutorial vindictiveness during plea bargaining. 
Unfortunately, however, the effects of Bordenkircher did not 
stop with plea bargaining. If it had, the issue of prosecutorial 
vindictiveness would be much simpler. However, in its majority 
1 51 d at 362. 
1 61 d at 365. 
171d. 
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opinion the Court seemingly contradicted the stance it took in North 
Carolina v. Pearce and Blackledge v. Perry when it said, ttthe due 
process violation in cases such as Pearce and Perry lay not in the 
possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a 
legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be 
retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his 
conviction. "1 8 In other words, the Court was not only making an 
exception for plea bargaining, but was discarding the appearance 
standard for judging vindictiveness and applying the in-fact model. 
This portion of the Court's stance caused considerable confusion 
about the purpose of the ban against prosecutorial vindictiveness. 
Lower courts were left to wonder the whether the purpose is to 
protect defendants from being deterred from exercising their rights, 
as had been assumed by the Pearce and Per ry precedents, or if it is 
to prevent prosecutors from acting vindictively, as the majority 
opinion of Bordenkircher had claimed. 
3. United States v. Goodwin 
Only a few years after the Bordenkircher decision, the Court 
once again had to answer a claim about prosecutorial vindictiveness. 
In United States v. Goodwin, a defendant was charged with a variety 
of misdemeanors. After a plea bargaining session in which the 
defendant declined to plead guilty and exercised his right to request 
that the trial be held before a jury instead of a judge, the prosecutor 
obtained a felony indictment based on the same facts as the original 
misdemeanors. The main difference in this case from Bordenkircher 
was that the prosecutor did not mention during the plea bargaining 
1 8434 u.S. at 363. 
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agreement the possibility that he would seek to Increase the charges 
if the defendant insisted upon his right to a jury trial. In addition, 
the prosecutor in this case produced an affidavit, to be included In 
the record, that listed the reasons for his increasing the charges and 
denied that the defendant's request for a Jury trial or refusal to 
plead guilty was one of those reasons. Upon Goodwin's appeal that 
he had been a victim of prosecutorial vindictiveness, a panel of 
Fourth Circuit judges reversed the conviction and, citing Pearce and 
Blackledge, affirmed that the defendant should be free to exercise his 
right to a jury trial without "the apprehension of retaliation. "1 9 In 
addition, the Fourth Circuit somewhat surprisingly cited 
Bordenkircher, because it had condemned situations which led to the 
"unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who had chosen 
to exercise a legal right. "2 0 
Upon the Fourth Circuit's overturning of this case, the United 
States filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. In an interesting 
majority opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court upheld the original 
conviction, and remanded it to the lower court for sentencing. First 
the Court admitted that punishment "is the very purpose" of a 
criminal proceeding, and that "motives are complex and difficult to 
prove, "2 1 and that "this reality had compelled the Court to establish a 
doctrine that requires the government to show that certain of its 
actions are not retaliatory. "22 However, the opinion went on to 
describe that this presumption of vindictiveness may only arise 
1 9Goodwin, 637 F. 2d at 253. 
2 Old. 
2 1457 U.S. at 372-73. 
22ld at 373. 
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when there is a "reasonable likelihood that vindictiveness exists. "2 3 
Furthermore, the opinion asserted that Goodwin's conviction could 
only be reversed if a presumption of vindictiveness was 
warran ted. "2 4 Therefore, in order for the claim of prosecutorial 
vindictiveness to be decided by the appearance standard, the Court 
would have to determine through judging the situation that a 
"reasonable likelihood" of vindictiveness did indeed exist. Next, the 
opinion distinguished between pre-trial and trial or post-trial 
evaluations of vindictiveness. It stated that pre-trial claims of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness must adhere to a more difficult test, 
because there were several reasons why prosecutorial behavior that 
might be questionable during or after the trial would be more likely 
to be legitimate in a pre-trial setting. These reasons include the 
possibility of the discovery of additional evidence and the realization 
of the full significance of the evidence the prosecutor had already 
accumulated. The line of thought that produced this statement 
concluded by saying that evidence during the trial or after the trial 
was "more likely to have been discovered and assessed," and 
therefore changes in the charging decisions at that point were "more 
likely to be improperly motivated. "25 In addition, the opinion stated 
that defendants were "expected to raise procedural challenges before 
trial. "26 Finally, the opinion talked about the very nature of the 
right, insistence upon trial by jury instead of judge, that was being 
asserted. The Court concluded that this right, although it did require 
2 3]d. 

24]d at 381. 

25] d. 

26]d. 
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somewhat more work by the prosecutor than trial by a judge, was 
not enough of a trouble either to the prosecutor or his resources to 
elicit a vindictive response. The majority opinion read, "the burdens 
of a jury trial are less significant than those imposed either by a 
general refusal to plead guilty, as in Bordenkircher, or a trial of any 
sort, as in Blackledge. Unlike the judge in Pearce or the prosecutor in 
Perry, a prosecutor has no stake in conducting a bench trial as 
opposed to a jury trial and is not being asked to do again that which 
he thought he had done correctly. "2 7 
According to all of this analysis (that the change in charging 
took place pre-trial, that the defense did not challenge the change at 
that point, and the fact that the defendant's insistence upon a Jury 
trial did not cause the prosecutor a great deal of trouble), the opinion 
stated that it was not probable that the change was due to 
vindictiveness. Therefore, the Court discarded the appearance 
standard of vindictiveness and required that the case be judged by 
the in-fact standard. It is important to note however, that the Court 
did recognize the need and usefulness of the appearance standard for 
judging certain claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Instead of 
trying to ignore or change the earlier opinions of Pearce and 
Blackledge, as the Bordenkircher decision did, it openly asserted 
those decisions as both wise and valid, but logically outlined the 
situations which made the appearance standard inappropriate for 
this case. In Goodwin, the Court not only preserved but reiterated 
the appearance standard, although in so doing the Court limited its 
scope of application. 
27Id at 383. 
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c. The Present Doctrine of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness 
The cases that have been outlined above are what make up the 
doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness today. From this synopsis 
the case law seems fairly complicated, but reasonable and even quite 
predictable. What it amounts to is this: there are two standards by 
which claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness may be tried (see figure 
3). One is the in-fact standard. This standard has the sole purpose of 
preventing prosecutors from acting vindictively. This standard 
places the burden of proof upon the defendant to prove that the 
prosecutor acted vindictively towards him. It is used in situations 
upon which the prosecutor would have little or no motive for acting 
vindictively. Those situations would be ones in which the prosecutor 
had no stake in the previous conviction, would not be asked to "do 
again that which he thought he had done correctly," or would not be 
put to a measurable inconvenience or suffer a measurable loss of 
prosecutorial resources by allowing the defendant to exercise his full 
rights. 
The other standard is the appearance standard. This standard 
has two primary purposes. One is to protect defendants from being 
deterred from exercising their rights by freeing them of the 
apprehension that a more severe sentence is an inherent risk of 
appeal or refusal to plead guilty. The other is to prevent prosecutors 
from acting vindictively. Sometimes the in-fact standard is 
inadequate to achieve this purpose because oftentimes "motives are 
complex and difficult to prove." The appearance standard places the 
burden of proof upon the prosecutor to prove that his behavior was 
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CLAIMS ADJUDICATED BY 
THE APPEARANCE STANDARD 
All of those cases in which the state 
has a motive to be vindictive, such 
as: 
Figure 3 
Two Standards for Evaluating 
Claims of Vindictiveness 
CLAIMS ADJUDICATED BY 
THE IN-FACT STANDARD 
All of those cases in which the state 
does not have a motive to be vin­
dictive, such as: 
CoIten v. Kentucky 
Case retried before a new 
judge. 
Chaffin v. Stynchecombe 
Case retried before a new 
jury. 
North Carolina v. Pearce 
case retried before same 
judge as in first trial. 
Blackledge v. Perry 
case in which same prose­
cutor enhances charges 
after a successful appeal 
United States v. Goodwin 
case in which defendant 
insisted upon a trial by 
jury. 
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not vindictive. This standard is applied when the prosecutor has a 
moti ve to be vindictive. Situations that would provide this motive 
include those in which a prosecutor has had a stake in the previous 
trial, those in which a prosecutor is asked to "do again that which he 
thought he had done correctly," and those in which the right being 
exercised by the defendant would cost the prosecutor a measurable 
amount of his scarce resources. 
Additionally, we should remember that there can be no claims 
of prosecutorial vindictiveness stemming from a prosecutor's 
behavior during plea bargaining. Bordenkircher v. Hayes served to 
carve out this important exception to the doctrine of vindictiveness 
in order to protect a prosecutorts power during plea bargaining. The 
Court eliminated all claims of vindictiveness within the plea 
bargaining context by observing that vindictiveness is "very 
different from the give and take negotiation common in plea 
bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably 
possess relatively equal bargaining power, "28 and "the importance of 
open plea bargaining outweighs the need to protect defendants from 
the possibility of prosecutorial vindictiveness. "29 
Still, many lower courts appear to be confused and unsure 
about how to judge cases of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Most of 
this confusion comes from a lack of knowing which standard should 
be used to determine prosecutorial vindictiveness in individual cases. 
For instance, the Sixth Circuit favors the in-fact standard (ltthe mere 
appearance of vindictiveness is not enough to trigger the Pearce­
28434 u.s. at 361. 
29See supra note 17. 
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Blackledge sanctions. "3 0) while the Ninth Circuit more closely applies 
the appearance standard. The biggest reason for this confusion is 
that these courts focus too much on the precedential effect of single 
cases rather than analyzing the line of reasoning displayed 
throughout the entire case law. The other reason for this confusion 
can be found buried in the portion of the Bordenki rcher decision not 
dealing with plea bargaining that distorted the reasoning of the 
Pearce and Blackledge decisions. To alleviate this problem, lower 
courts should simply ignore that part of the decision and restrict 
Bordenkircher to its plea bargaining context. This is because the 
attempt it made to contradict the reasoning of earlier cases, in their 
own context, must be looked upon as being on rather shaky ground. 
In addition, it is important to note that Bordenkircher was an in-fact 
case (one in which the presence of vindictiveness was openly present 
and even admitted to) and thus should have little relevance to the 
pre-existing appearance of vindictiveness doctrine.3 1 
Thus, while present application of prosecutorial vindictiveness 
claims seem to be somewhat confused, there is no real need for them 
to be. Claims of vindictive behavior stemming from plea negotiations 
are to be dismissed. The appearance standard for determining 
claims of vindictiveness is used under circumstances in which a 
prosecutor has a motive to be vindictive. In circumstances where 
there is no motive for vindictive behavior, courts should apply the 
in-fact standard. 
3 %33 F .2d at 455. 
3 lSee supra note 19 at 253. 
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Conclusion 
The prosecuting attorney is one of the most valuable and 
powerful public officials in today's society. He is the person who is 
charged with achieving justice swiftly and accurately, while 
burdened with only a scarcity of resources. In order to achieve this 
nearly impossible task the prosecutor is granted a large degree of 
discretion over the use of his power. In order to ensure that the 
prosecutor is qualified to handle all of the many tasks his job 
requires, he must go through a lengthy and difficult educational 
process. 
However, upon receiving a position as a public prosecutor, the 
prosecutor will find that he not only needs a complete understanding 
of the law, but also needs to deal with the many pressures that are 
an inherent part of his job. A plethora of duties, a large backlog of 
cases, a scarcity of resources, and the spoils of an impressive 
, conviction rate all entice the prosecutor to take any shortcuts he can 
in order to successfully dispense with as many cases as possible. 
These pressures are what often lead the prosecutor to abuse his 
discretionary power. 
One such abuse of a prosecutor's discretionary power is 
prosecutorial vindictiveness. This is defined by the courts as "the 
forbidden practice of penalizing a defendant's exercise of a right, "3 2 
hence it applies to any retaliatory conduct of a prosecutor's charging 
power. This retaliatory conduct usually occurs after a defendant 
3 2See supra note 6. 
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rejects a plea negotiation offered by a prosecutor or after a 
successful appeal of a conviction by a defendant. 
The Supreme Court has set forth two standards for judging 
claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness: the in-fact standard and the 
appearance standard. The in-fact standard has the purpose of 
preventing the prosecutor from engaging in vindictive behavior and 
leaves the burden of proof upon the defendant to show that the 
prosecutor's actions were, in fact, vindictive. This standard is used to 
decide claims in which the prosecutor has no motive for engaging in 
vindictive behavior. The appearance standard has the purpose of 
protecting defendants from being deterred from exercising their 
constitutional rights by freeing them from the apprehension that a 
more severe sentence is an inherent risk of appeal or refusal to plead 
gUilty. This standard places the burden of proof upon the prosecutor 
to show that his actions were not, in fact, vindictive. This standard is 
used in deciding claims in which the prosecutor has a motive to act 
vindictively. Because motives are nearly impossible to prove, the 
determination of which standard is to be used almost always 
determines the outcome of the claim. 
One important exception to this rule arose in Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes. The decision in this case effectively disallowed claims of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness in plea bargaining contexts. This was a 
result of the Supreme Court's decision that "the value of open plea 
bargaining outweighs the need to protect defendants from 
prosecutorial vindictiveness. " 
The lower courts still seem to be confused about how to judge 
claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness. This seems to be a result of 
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traditional legal thinking, which stresses the importance of individual 
precedents. Unfortunately, these precedents have often been 
extended beyond their original scope of meaning. Courts need to 
understand that when a new situation in this issue arises, the 
outcome of the case based on that situation applies only to that 
situation. They should not attempt to extend the new precedent to 
cover situations which have already been provided for. By analyzing 
the logic displayed throughout the entirety of cases that make up the 
case law, instead of dwelling solely on particular decisions, these 
courts would find that the present doctrine of prosecutorial 
vindictiveness is fairly easy to understand and can even be quite 
predictable. 
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Selected Glossary 
ADJUDICATE: To hear and decide a case of law. 
CASE LAW: 	 Law based on previous judicial decisions, or precedents; 
distinguished from statute law. 
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS: The forbidden practice of 
penalizing a defendanes 
exercise of a right. 
TRIAL DE NOVO: A completely new retrial; no records of the past 
trial are allowed, no testimony of the past trial is 
allowed, and the outcome of the past trial has no 
bearing upon the new retrial. 
29 
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